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Saving the Republic: State Nostalgia
and Slavery Reparations in Media and
Political Discourses
Nicola Frith*
Memories of slavery have long been a contentious subject, but no more so than when the
question of reparations is raised. This article investigates French media and political
responses to reparations within the context of international movements that are
pressurising European and US governments to engage more actively with the legacies of
their slave pasts. The particular reference here is to the citizen-led activist group, the Conseil
Repre´sentatif des Associations Noires, whose call for a national debate on reparations in
2012 and 2013 was rejected by the French state and misrepresented by the French media.
These responses are placed within the context of both the (first) Taubira law (2001), which
recognised slavery as a ‘crime against humanity’, and the ‘memory war’ of 2005–2006.
Nostalgia is shown to intersect with state and media responses in a number of ways. First
and foremost, reparations are seen as anti-republican in nature, being misunderstood as
the divisive work of ethnic minorities. Fears of communitarian fracture invoke nostalgia for
an imagined wholeness that preceded the state’s act of recognition. Secondly, reparations
are defined as ‘impossible’ by appealing to their ‘divine’ irreparability. This article
challenges the inertia of state nostalgia and the limitations of media representations by
reconnecting reparations to a recognition struggle against racial discrimination.
Les me´moires de l’esclavage sont depuis longtemps un sujet controverse´, et ce d’autant plus
quand la question des re´parations est souleve´e. Cet article examine des re´ponses politiques
et me´diatiques aux re´parations dans le contexte des mouvements internationaux qui font
pression sur divers gouvernements europe´ens aussi bien que sur le gouvernement
ame´ricain pour qu’ils s’engagent plus activement dans l’he´ritage du passe´ esclavagiste.
L’article fait re´fe´rence en particulier au Conseil Repre´sentatif des Associations Noires, une
association militante dirige´e par des citoyens qui, en 2012 et 2013, a fait appel a` un de´bat
national sur les re´parations qui a e´te´ rejete´ par l’E´tat francais et de´nature´ par les me´dias.
q 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
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Nous mettons ces re´ponses dans le contexte de la (premie`re) loi Taubira (2001), qui a
reconnu l’esclavage comme ‘crime contre l’humanite´’, aussi bien que ‘la guerre de
me´moires’ (2005–2006). Nous montrerons que la nostalgie traverse ces re´ponses e´tatiques
et me´diatiques a` plusieurs niveaux. D’abord et avant tout, l’E´tat et les me´dias de´finissent
la nature des re´parations comme e´tant contre l’ide´ologie re´publicaine en les interpre´tant
errone´ment comme un travail de division mene´ par des minorite´s ethniques. La peur
d’une fracture communautariste provoque l’e´mergence d’un discours nostalgique qui
imagine l’existence d’un monde ante´rieur et bien inte´gre´ qui a cesse´ d’exister avant l’acte
de reconnaissance porte´e par l’E´tat. Deuxie`mement, l’E´tat et les me´dias de´finissent les
re´parations comme e´tant ‘impossibles’ en faisant appel a` la nature irre´parable du crime.
Cet article conteste l’inertie de cette nostalgie e´tatique et enqueˆte sur les limites des
repre´sentations me´diatiques tout en remettant les re´parations dans le contexte d’une lutte
pour la reconnaissance et contre la discrimination raciale.
On 10 May 2013, Francois Hollande gave a speech in the Jardin du Luxembourg in
honour of the eighth ‘National Day for Remembering the Slave Trade, Slavery and
Their Abolitions’. Since 2006, 10 May has fulfilled one of the criteria outlined in the
(first) Taubira law (21 May 2001), which not only recognised slavery and the slave
trade as ‘crimes against humanity’, but also stipulated the need to commemorate the
abolition of slavery on a yearly basis. Although largely ignored by the national press,
this annual event generated unusually high levels of media interest in 2013 owing to
the controversies that emerged over the subject of reparations for slavery. On the day
of the ceremony, the Conseil Repre´sentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN) registered
a complaint against a major public financial institution, la Caisse des De´poˆts et
Consignations (CDC), for having administered the debt paid by Haiti to France in
return for its independence (1804), and therefore for its complicity in a crime against
humanity. This highly political act ensured that 10 May became front-page news, with
Hollande’s speech offering a subtle, but nonetheless clear, rebuttal to what he termed
an ‘impossible re´paration’; a phrase that he borrowed, rather conveniently, from the
Martiniquais politician and poet Aime´ Ce´saire.
The president’s refusal can be seen as characteristic of a more general scepticism
concerning the subject of reparations, particularly within media and political circles in
France. However, it is also a moment that can only be understood by setting it within
the broader national and international contexts in which memories of slavery have
emerged in response to citizen-led demands for nation-states to begin recognising
and repairing the persistent harms of the slave past on contemporary society. It is,
therefore, a moment in which to explore the limitations of France’s response to the
demands of African descendants for recognition and revalorisation within the
Republic, while examining more closely the discursive strategies utilised by the state
and the media to delegimitise the grounds for a public debate on reparations.
Specifically, this article will position the responses of the media and the state to the
CRAN’s appeal for a debate on reparations within a nostalgic framework of analysis.
2 N. Frith
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It will focus on the different forms of post-colonial and nationalistic nostalgia that
have been materialising alongside recent attempts by the state and civil society to begin
confronting France’s history of slavery, notably through acts of memorialisation and
commemoration. The ways in which nostalgia repeatedly slips in through the back
door of public discourses will be shown with reference to two important moments in
recent media history: first, the 1998 sesquicentenary of the Abolition Act of 1848,
which led to an act of state recognition with the passing of the (first) Taubira law in
2001; and second, the emergence of a highly mediatised ‘memory war’ in 2005–2006
in which the Taubira law became embroiled in broader debates over memories of
France’s colonial past, and especially those concerning North Africa. Indeed, it is only
by exploring this recent counter-attack on memory—or rather attack on ‘counter-
memory’1—that we can understand the latest journalistic and political backlash to
reparations.
In this way, reparations will be situated within the specific context of France’s
socio-political and memorial environment. This will enable us to explore not only
why reparations remain taboo, but also how the construction of this taboo is intimately
connected to political and media strategies of representation that serve to misrecognise
the meaning of reparations by playing into broader fears of social fracture or
‘communautarisme’. It is important not to forget that demands for France to engage
fully in acknowledging its historical involvement in slavery originated, in part, from
the work of activist groups whose membership includes many from France’s overseas
departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guyana and Re´union. Yet, their
‘demands’ are concerned, not with fracture, but with a desire for cultural and historical
recognition within the French Republic. It will be argued then that the work of these
groups, such as the CRAN, ought to be seen more broadly as part of a ‘recognition
struggle’ in the sense that they have emerged because ‘misrecognition or
nonrecognition’ is applied to ‘members of excluded or marginalized groups [who]
find their way of life or status as persons denigrated and devalued’ (Hobson 2003, 1).
The marginalised group to which this article refers can be identified, broadly, as
France’s black and/or Antillean population, who are united, to quote Ndiaye, by ‘une
expe´rience de l’identite´ prescrite, celle du Noir . . . qui a e´te´ historiquement associe´e a`
des expe´riences de domination subie’ (2008, 57).
What this suggests is that the emergence of memories of slavery, alongside the
more recent demands for a debate on reparations, ought to be seen as facets of a
much broader struggle to recognise and repair the long-lasting social, cultural and
economic effects of France’s colonial and slave pasts, and particularly that of racial
discrimination. It is only by unpicking the logic of the ‘impossibility’ that justifies the
state’s refusal to confront these demands, and by understanding how nostalgia
operates as a mechanism for blocking the process of working through the crimes of
the slave past, that this article will problematise the discursive field within which
reparations have been articulated by media and official discourses to date.
Reparations will be reframed as a possible means to move beyond the nostalgic
stagnation of state-sanctioned memory and ceremony by exploring, not their
Modern & Contemporary France 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 04
:42
 20
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
‘impossibility’, but rather their possibility in relation to a long-standing desire for
social justice.
The Rise in Reparations Movements: An International Perspective
Reparations must first be situated within a broader international context since the
French state’s official rejection has occurred just as calls for reparations are gaining
traction on an international scale. Of course, calls for different forms of reparative
justice have a history almost as long as slavery itself (Brooks 2004, 4–19), but
recent international events have pushed reparations back into the media spotlight.
This latest wave might be viewed as the culmination of what Brooks identifies as
‘the modern phase of the black redress movement’ (12). He dates this back to
Congressman John Conyers’s introduction of the ‘H.R. 40: Commission to Study
Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act’, which he has reintroduced every
year since 1989. Included in this ‘modern phase’ are landmark events, such as the
‘World Conference Against Racism’, held in Durban in 2001, to name but one,
which was boycotted by US state representatives because of its focus on reparations.
Despite this top-level resistance, since the year 2000, some 14 US states have voted
to obligate companies to declare financial gains made from slavery, resulting in
offers to provide collective forms of reparation, such as college grants (Tin 2013,
88–94).
France, however, remains (with the exception of Senegal) the only former slaving
nation to have decreed slavery a crime against humanity in law. This in turn has
provided the legal justification for the emergence of a new network of pro-
reparation movements in the overseas departments, with the year 2005 seeing the
Mouvement International pour les Re´parations (MIR) in Martinique filing a case
against the French state for its role in a crime against humanity. These movements
have been spurred and legitimised, in part, by other ‘successes’, such as the long-
awaited Mau Mau trial in Britain, which resulted in financial compensation being
paid to individuals and the issuing of a formal apology by the British government
in 2013 (Elkins 2013). The decision for Caribbean leaders to strengthen their
collective claims for reparations using the same law firm (Leigh Day) that won the
case for the Mau Mau (Associated Press 2013; Caricom 2013) has resulted in the
issuing of a 10-point plan calling the former slaving nations of Europe to engage in
a process of reparatory justice (Leigh Day 2014). While the Caricom case is
markedly different from that of the Mau Mau—the latter focusing on
compensation, while the former calls for a far wider programme of reparative
justice that includes everything from a formal apology and debt cancellation to
cultural and development programmes, as well as psychological repair—both cases
nonetheless suggest that reparations are experiencing a period of re-radicalisation.
This movement promises to escalate in the wake of the US’s forthcoming
commemoration of the 150th anniversary of its Thirteenth Amendment in 2015,
which will provide an important political context in which to revisit the question of
4 N. Frith
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reparations and thus bring about ‘the culmination of a long African American
human rights struggle’ (Biondi 2003, 5).
‘Restorative Nostalgia’: A Cure for ‘Social Fracture’?
The above summary outlines, albeit briefly, some of the most important transnational
and international movements in which calls for reparations have most recently been
articulated, including those of Louis-George Tin, the president of the CRAN, in his
recent publication entitled Esclavage et re´parations. Comment faire face aux crimes de
l’Histoire (2013). While there is no doubt that reparations movements in France
and its overseas departments draw from these broader contexts, an analysis of the
discursive knots in which memories of slavery and reparations have become entangled
in France additionally requires focusing on what is specific about France’s socio-
political and memorial environment. This then means returning to some of the most
important historical moments in which memories of slavery have surfaced, notably the
150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery. Held throughout April 1998 and placed
under the heading ‘Tous ne´s en 1848’, this national event set the tone for the
subsequent commemorations that would be held on 10 May from 2006 onwards. The
slogan, explained Lionel Jospin (then prime minister under Chirac), was intended ‘a`
vous rappeler que vous eˆtes les he´ritiers de ce combat’ (Jospin 1998). ‘Tous ne´s en
1848’ is a small but significant phrase. It operates as a metonym for the French
government’s approach to remembering France’s role in slavery by conjoining the
metropole and its overseas departments in a celebratory and unifying national
narrative centred on the abolitionist figure of Victor Schœlcher. It therefore acts
simultaneously as a discursive strategy for distancing the current French Republic and
its citizens from any form of post-colonial blame (Frith 2013b, 23–24), recalling the
tactics undertaken by the newly elected political powers of Martinique who, from 1848
onwards, considered that ‘Oublier le passe´ e´tait donner le point ze´ro d’une nouvelle
socie´te´ qui consolidait leur re´ussite et portait les promesses de leur reconnaissance
sociale’ (Cottias 1997, 300).
While the presidential speeches of 10 May, which have traversed the presidencies of
Chirac, Sarkozy and nowHollande, have taken significant steps since 1998 to recognise,
for example, the role of the enslaved in their own emancipation, they remain anxiously
driven by a desire to connect French national identity to the celebratory narrative of
abolitionism. Moreover, their overt promotion of social integration often risks
reproducing the language of the colonialist ‘project d’unification sociale’ of post-
abolition society (Cottias 1997, 312). Viewed critically, these presidential speeches can
be seen as part of a nostalgic process that, while recognising the criminality and
dehumanisation of slavery, wishes to save the Republic from the detrimental effects
that remembering its past crimes could have on its collective identity today.
By associating the Republic with abolitionism, these speeches not only operate as a
strategy for eliding the question of reparations, but also for creating the kind of heritage
myth described by Kammen as ‘something that suffuses us with pride rather than with
Modern & Contemporary France 5
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shame’ (cited in Boym 2001, xiv). The speeches are therefore nostalgic in the sense that
they are ‘essentially history without guilt’ (to borrow from Kammen), and serve to
create what Boym describes as a ‘guilt-free homecoming’ (xiv). This is experienced, not
by exiles living outside of France, but by those living within the imagined space of the
national border who can only confront the horrors of the past by refuting their
continuous effects on the present.
Hollande’s presidential speech of 10 May 2014 offers the most recent example of
this process (Hollande 2014). It might be seen as part of what Boym has termed
elsewhere ‘restorative nostalgia’. This, she writes, is typical of ‘national and nationalist
revivals all over the world, which engage in the antimodern myth-making of history
by means of a return to national symbols and myths’ (2001, 41). For example,
Hollande claims that the re-establishment of slavery under Napoleon Bonaparte in
1802, following its belated abolition under the First Republic in 1794, was not part of
‘la nation ge´ne´reuse et universaliste de la Re´volution’. Indeed, ‘La France n’est
vraiment la France que lorsqu’elle de´fend des valeurs partout dans le monde.’ This
familiar construction between French identity and the kind of universal rights that
underpinned the abolitionist movement is politically useful in fuelling nostalgic
nationalist mythologies. It ‘conspires to blur [ . . . the] official contemporaneity’ of
slavery, to use Jameson’s phrasing, so that the past becomes endowed with ‘the spell
and distance of a glossy mirage’ (1991, 21). This strategy enables the state to avoid
confronting the post-1848 history of colonial exploitation, while evading the subject
of the financial compensation paid to the former plantation owners under the
Second Republic and glossing over the ongoing socio-economic disparities between
metropolitan France and its outre-mer, all of which would justify a debate on
reparations.
Strategic forgetfulness in the name of national unity is certainly nothing new to
the history of slavery. As Cottias notes, the 1848 abolition decree ‘a eu pour effet
d’enraciner l’oubli de l’esclavage dans le me´tare´cit national en ignorant l’expe´rience de
ce passe´ esclavagiste’ (2005, 59). Only by forgetting the crimes of the past could
assimilation and integration be achieved, which suggests that remembering the past is
problematic, especially in terms of the state’s relationship with its overseas citizens
(Garraway 2008, 366). It is not surprising then that the contentious issue of
reparations was immediately ejected from the Taubira law (10 February 1999) in the
name of political consensus. Article 5 of the proposed law replaced the committee of
experts, who were originally charged with examining ‘les conditions de re´paration due
au titre de ce crime’ (emphasis added; 22 December 1998), with a committee of
experts who would guarantee ‘la pe´rennite´ de la me´moire de ce crime’ (emphasis
added; 10 May 2001). Arguably, this shift from reparations to memory allowed the
Republic to maintain its celebratory abolitionist narrative since collective memory, as
Rieff points out elsewhere, offers a more malleable political tool for nations to ‘“revise”
and “rewrite”’ (2011, 15) their narratives. Conversely, to ratify the state’s intention
to assess reparations was to risk redefining the state as the criminal perpetrator
(Frith 2013b, 24) and thus awaken the spectre of social fracture.
6 N. Frith
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By concentrating on memory, the Taubira law could be unanimously passed, yet
that political accord did not last long. From 2005 to 2006, the Taubira law came under
direct attack twice: first by a group of historians, spearheaded by Pierre Nora, who
demanded the abrogation of all memory laws (12 December 2005);2 and then by a
group of UMP ministers who demanded the abrogation of the Taubira law five days
before the first ‘National Day for Remembering Slavery, the Slave Trade and Their
Abolitions’ in 2006. These attacks were part of a wider debate instigated by the 23
February 2005 law which famously attempted to rehabilitate France’s colonial past by
remembering ‘le roˆle positif de la pre´sence francaise outre-mer, notamment en Afrique
du Nord’. A heated discussion—or what the French media termed ‘une guerre de
me´moire’—ensued, dividing those who rejected France’s turn towards memory as
‘repentant’ and anti-republican from those who wished to see an end to France’s
silencing of its colonial past (Blanchard, Bancel, and Lemaire 2006; Blanchard and
Veyrat-Masson 2010; Stora and Lecle`re 2011).
What would become a political and intellectual backlash to the kind of memories, or
counter-memories, that challenge the idea of France’s mission civilisatrice can be
interpreted as nostalgic on two interconnected levels. First and most obviously, the
23 February law points to the presence of a post-colonial or imperial nostalgia that wishes
to restore a more positive view of the colonial past in response to the steps taken (such as
the Taubira law) to remember the less ‘glorious’ moments of French history. Indeed, the
entire period inwhich the ‘guerre deme´moire’ took place represents an important shift in
public consciousness, whereby ‘la souffrance et la nostalgie des pieds-noirs’, which had
once been the preserve of the extreme right, now found a home among the more
mainstreampolitical parties (Stora andLecle`re 2011, 22).As such, it openedupa space for
the rejection of counter-memory as an objectionable form of post-colonial repentance.
This rejection intersects with a second form of nostalgia that emerges from a more
generalised fear that the Republic and its values are failing and are no longer capable of
sustaining narratives of social cohesion. The result is a desire for a return to an
(imagined) un-fractured Republic, necessarily rooted in the forgetfulness of its
misdeeds, a place where France’s heroic national identity is no longer troubled by
histories that it would rather forget. The assumption, to borrow Stauth and Turner’s
phrasing, is that therewas once aworld of unified ‘feeling and communal relations’ that,
in giving way to a ‘pluralization of life-worlds [ . . . and] an intense fragmentation of
belief and practice’, makes the former world seem seductively simple (1988, 512–513).
There are many examples that could be used to exemplify this overtly anti-repentant
and revisionist nostalgic turn, the best known being Bruckner’s La Tyrannie de la
pe´nitence (2006). But equally typical and revealing is the response of the writer and
historian Max Gallo. In a text published in the wake of the November 2005 riots and
entitled unequivocally Fier d’eˆtre francais (2006), Gallo attacks those who ‘choisissent
de se regrouper en communaute´s ethniques et qui pre´tendent [ . . . ] se de´finir comme
des “Noirs”, des “Indige`nes” oppose´s aux Blancs, aux descendants de colonisateurs’
(2006, 52). For Gallo, these are not legitimate, activist groups engaging in a
recognition struggle against racial discrimination and socio-economic inequality, but
Modern & Contemporary France 7
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rather fracturing agents that are leading France towards disaster. He laments, ‘Honteux
de notre passe´, nous sommes condamne´s non seulement a` la repentance, mais a` nous
de´sagre´ger, a` nous diviser, a` capituler, a` mourir dans l’aigreur, l’amertume, la haine,
[ . . . ] nation balkanise´e, violente´e, livre´e aux bandes communautaristes’ (132). This
minority ‘attack’ on French national identity triggers nostalgia for a period that
preceded the memory laws and is underpinned by a desire to revamp France’s lost
national pride. His nostalgia for this ‘loss’ thus arises from a sense of metaphysical
exile in which he feels estranged from a republican homeland by being forced to recall
histories that challenge national mythologies. The suggestion is that the nation has
become a stranger to itself as a direct effect of the divisive behaviour of ethnic
minorities. His writings imply a longing to return to a past in which memories of
slavery and colonialism were less visible, leading to the uncomfortable conclusion that
Gallo’s ‘restorative nostalgia’ wishes to erase the histories and memories that are
deemed to belong to the ethnic ‘other’, and not to the French nation as a whole.
Conversely, the ethnic ‘other’—the scapegoat here (as elsewhere) for social fracture—
must either be assimilated or rejected in a (nostalgic) return to the colonialist-
assimilationist discourse that operates under the cover of republican universalism.
‘Oui a` la me´moire, non a` la re´paration’: Media and Political Responses to
Reparations
CRAN’s Appeal
The discursive strategies of ‘restorative nostalgia’ that reject counter-memory as
repentance provide a useful basis for analysing the media’s and state’s reactions to
the question of reparations posed in 2012 and 2013 by the president of the CRAN,
Louis-George Tin. By 2012, there had been an important change in presidential
leadership. The election of the socialist Francois Hollande promised a renewed
engagement with the slave past in contrast with the strongly ‘anti-repentant’ stance
adopted by Nicolas Sarkozy in response to the ‘memory war’ of 2005–2006. Under
Hollande, two of the highest-ranking positions were given to ministers with direct
links to memories of slavery. The position of prime minister was given to Jean-Marc
Ayrault, the former de´pute´-maire of Nantes (France’s foremost slave port) and the
political voice behind the Me´morial a` l’abolition de l’esclavage (inaugurated in March
2012). The position of minister for justice was given to Christiane Taubira-Delannon,
the former de´pute´ for French Guiana and author of the 2001 Taubira law. With election
promises to support cultural projects that would foreground France’s history in
colonialism and slavery (Blanchard et al. 2012), the scene appeared to be set for a more
active period of memory work.
On 12October 2012, Tin launched an appeal in LeMonde that called for an end to the
taboo over slavery reparations by means of a public debate. Signed by a number of
political, intellectual and public figures and activists, the appeal was intended to return
to the original wording of the Taubira law, referred to as ‘un texte de loi ampute´’, by
8 N. Frith
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 04
:42
 20
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
discussing ‘de nouvelles actions et politiques publiques, permettant de re´pondre a`
l’he´ritage durable de l’esclavage colonial: racisme anti-Noir, discriminations, ine´galite´s’
(Collectif 2012). Although it was recognised that such a debate would undoubtedly
incite a wide variety of reactions, its importance would nonetheless lie in breaking an
enduring silence: ‘l’e`re du tabou est termine´e; l’heure du de´bat est arrive´e’ (Collectif
2012). Echoing MIR’s campaign for ‘Reconnaissance, re´parations et re´conciliation’,
reparations were placed at the very centre of a process that moves beyond the
recognition of the Taubira law and towards the goal of reconciliation. As Tin explained,
‘La reconnaissance a e´te´ permise par la loi Taubira . . . . La re´paration est ce dont nous
parlons aujourd’hui. La re´conciliation sera l’horizon de ce processus. Mais il n’y aura
pas de vraie re´conciliation, sans vraie re´paration’ (“Esclavage . . . ” 2012).
The logic underpinning this desire for reparative justice reproduces that of the
economist and social choice theorist, Amartya Sen (2009), who argues that the
recognition of a tragedy cannot remain at the ‘observation’ stage, but must move
towards a ‘diagnosis of injustice’ (4–5). Yet, as Sen notes, more often than not the
‘placid guardians of order and justice’ (namely the state) work to avoid this diagnostic
process, being either ‘unsure of the grounds for action, or unwilling to scrutinize the
basis of their policies’ (4). It would appear then that the French state is stuck precisely
at this point of stagnation, being reluctant to move beyond recognition and into a
diagnostic, as opposed to memorial, phase. Indeed, the actions of the CRAN’s
president throw a critical light on the kind of symbolic or moral reparations offered by
the French state to date, which might, in a harsh light, be seen as what Trouillot has
termed a series of ‘abortive rituals’; that is, ‘the repetition of . . . formulas [ . . . that
have] yet to convince the populations involved that the problem has been solved’
(2000, 185). These have included the establishment of an important, yet woefully
under-funded, government committee (Comite´ pour la me´moire de l’esclavage
[CPME]),3 a small stele and sculpture hidden among the trees of the Jardin du
Luxembourg, and the 10 May ceremony that was thrice ignored by Sarkozy in 2009,
2010 and 2012.
To move beyond recognition would be to define reparations and identify a legal and
social framework in which to bring them into being. This would also require looking at
other cases that have dealt with crimes against humanity, while being sensitive to the fact
that these have generally taken place within the lifespan of the perpetrators and victims.
The most obvious model for slavery, where the crime has been identified retrospectively,
is the truth and reconciliation committee. Thismodel has emerged, as Darcy notes, as the
‘common mechanism used in post-conflict or transitional societies’, with some 30 to 40
committees having been held over the past few decades (2011, 43). Not surprisingly, then,
Tin also recommends a version of this, which he names ‘un organe “Re´paration et
re´conciliation”’, thatwould explore ‘les flux financiers—ou` est passe´ l’argent de la traite—
et quelles pratiques de re´paration ont marche´ dans le monde’ (Henry 2012a). Similarly,
Francoise Verge`s (the former president of the Comite´ pour la me´moire et l’histoire de
l’esclavage [CPMHE]) speaks of ‘un processus du type “ve´rite´ et re´conciliation”: on
e´coute les chercheurs, les experts, les personnes concerne´es’ (Henry 2012b). This would
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not be about creating a binary between ‘victimes contre bourreaux’, but about
constructing effective ‘politiques publiques: des programmes de recherche, d’e´ducation,
desmanuels scolaires, des centres de documentation, en faisant attention aux populations
les plus meurtries’ (Verge`s, cited in Libe´ration, see Henry 2012b).
The image that we receive here is that reparations remain open to definition and
part of a broader process that wishes to work towards societal reconciliation. This
requires bringing about effective forms of recognition that probe the links between the
history of slavery on the one hand, and contemporary forms of racial discrimination
and socio-economic inequality on the other. Reparations are therefore about a broader
‘recognition struggle’; one that is echoed by the CRAN’s overarching aims to fight
against ‘les discriminations raciales’, ‘les ine´galite´s sociales’ and ‘les injustices post-
coloniales’. Hence the reason that Tin considers reparations as a term that ‘“englobe
tout”, c’est en effet la re´paration qui “permet de penser l’ensemble du combat
antiraciste”’ (Le Liboux 2013), suggesting that the symbolic form of reparation offered
by the Taubira law still needs to be transformed into something with direct societal
effects, the conduit for which is no longer simply memory.
Political Responses to Reparations
The possibilities of this debate were entirely misrecognised and misrepresented by
both the state and the media. The appeal had been carefully timed to maximise
its media impact. It coincided with both Hollande’s visit to Gore´e Island—a key site
of memory on the UNESCO Slave Trade Route—and the president’s speech in
Dakar (Hollande 2012). This speech was intended to outline Hollande’s approach to
Africa, while tacitly distancing himself from the neo-colonialist and nostalgic
imperialism of Sarkozy’s infamous ‘Discours de Dakar’ (26 July 2007) (“Le
Discours . . . ” 2007). Shortly after his address, the press informed Hollande that
Ayrault’s government was willing to open up discussions on the topic of reparations:
‘Matignon re´fle´chit a` “re´parer” l’esclavage’, ran the headline in Le Figaro (AFP 2012).
The E´lyse´e advisors mobilised immediately and an urgent response was issued to
divert attention away from reparations and back towards Hollande’s key message: ‘Il
ne s’agit pas de re´parer quoi que ce soit mais de porter notre vision de l’Afrique,’ stated
a close advisor in Le Monde. ‘On a parle´ de la fin de la Francafrique’ (Chaˆtelot 2012).
Faced with this refusal, Tin’s next move was direct action set to coincide with the
eighth ‘National Day for Remembering Slavery, the Slave Trade and Their Abolitions’
(10 May 2013). This time, however, the president had been forewarned. Notices in the
press had stated that the CRAN was planning an action ‘hautement symbolique’ that
would ‘frapper fort en assignant en justice une grande banque francaise’ suspected of
former links to slavery (Le Liboux 2013). The details of the plan were revealed on 10
May, with breaking news that the CRAN had registered a complaint against the CDC
for having profited from the slave trade by collecting the debt paid by Haiti to France
as financial compensation for its independence following the Haitian Revolution
(1791–1804).4 While this act echoes moves in the US to obligate companies to declare
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financial gain made from slavery, its importance (like the 12 October appeal) would lie
more in its symbolism and media appeal. ‘Si on fait cette assignation, c’est pour
alimenter le de´bat’, stated the CRAN’s legal advisor, Norbert Tricaud (AFP 2013a). But
even if this was little more than a media ‘happening’, as one of Tin’s adversaries
commented (Libe´ration, May 10, 2013), it nonetheless had a number of immediate
effects. First, it ensured full media coverage for the commemoration, an event that
normally generates little media attention. Second, it brought the subject of reparations
into the public arena for debate at a media level, even if the question at a state level was
immediately shut down. Third, it forced Hollande to confront, however indirectly, the
subject of slavery reparations in his 10 May speech. What emerged from Hollande’s
and the media’s responses to these calls was a dichotomy between the state’s desire to
move directly from recognition to reconciliation using memory as its vehicle, contrary
to the CRAN’s emphasis on reparations (in its broadest sense) as the sole means of
achieving reconciliation.
In this light, Hollande’s speech of 10 May 2013 was less as an act of recognition, or
even duty, than an act of political refusal. It tacitly rejected material reparations and
reaffirmed the state’s moral commitment to memory, the word ‘re´paration’ only
appearing once and qualified with the adjective ‘impossible’. As Libe´ration’s headline
summarised, ‘Oui a` la me´moire, non a` la re´paration mate´rielle’ (“Hollande . . . ”
2013). The rebuff was structured in three ways. First, Hollande reasserted the state’s
commitment to the duty to remember: ‘Le seul choix possible, c’est celui de la
me´moire, et c’est la vigilance, et c’est la transmission’ (Hollande 2013). The infamous
‘devoir de me´moire’ operates politically as a reason to avoid talking about other
forms of reparation, while positioning the state in a flattering light that frees it from
further responsibility. So while calls for reparations have been increasing on the
international stage, Hollande’s response opted to focus on the work undertaken by
‘les artisans de la me´moire’ at a specifically local level. The vast majority of his speech
is then devoted to listing individual artistic projects, one of which, he announced,
would be part funded by the state: Me´morial ACTe in Guadeloupe. This large-scale
project, currently under construction in Pointe-a`-Pitre, is described as a ‘projet
emble´matique’ that will function as an ‘Œuvre de re´conciliation, geste de paix’
(Hollande 2013). In this way, an explicitly regional project is co-opted to perform the
role of achieving ‘la paix des me´moires re´concilie´es’ (Hollande 2013) for France as a
whole, while the choice of wording is carefully selected to respond indirectly to the
CRAN’s challenge. Yet beneath the promise of this financial commitment (as yet
unfulfilled) lies a rather more obvious absence: the continuing lack of a national
centre to slavery and colonialism that had been promised under Chirac (see
Glissant 2007), shelved under Sarkozy and repeatedly requested by the CPMHE
(2013, 63–66).
Secondly, Hollande’s expropriation of Me´morial ACTe extends to other political acts.
He does not avoid the issue of reparations entirely, but speaks of a debt towards Africa:
‘la dette souscrite a` l’e´gard de l’Afrique’ and ‘la part funeste prise par la France dans
l’exploitation des terres d’Afrique’ (Hollande 2013). These are important acknowl-
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edgements since they take the unusual step of touching upon French colonialism and not
just slavery. However, claims that this debt is being repaid by contemporaneous foreign
policies, such as France’s military intervention intoMali during 2013, and that this serves
to compensate for the ‘sacrifice de milliers d’Africains venus . . . libe´rer [la France]’
(Hollande 2013), seem opportunistic at best, and are more likely intended to ward off
any other reparative claims concerning France’s colonial past.
Thirdly, and most significantly, Hollande asserts the impossibility of reparation by
reminding us of the inherent irreparability of any ‘crime against humanity’. To support
his argument, he quotes from Ce´saire: ‘Il y aurait une note a` payer et ensuite ce serait
fini . . . Non, ce ne sera jamais re´gle´’ (Hollande 2013). This quotation has been lifted
from Ce´saire’s interviews with Francoise Verge`s (2005), a full reading of which
provides a far more complex reading of the poet’s attitude towards reparations. It is
true that Ce´saire objects to the term ‘re´parations’—‘Essayons d’employer d’autres
termes’—but this is because it risks defining Afro-descendants as ‘une bande de
mendiants’ (Ce´saire and Verge`s 2005, 40). Likewise, he rejects the idea of a single
financial payment because this ‘serait trop facile’ (38). He nonetheless asserts that the
West is answerable to its crimes and has a duty to assist those who have been adversely
affected as a result (39–40). This is overlooked by Hollande (2013), who utilises a
simplified understanding of Ce´saire’s morally grounded approach to reparations both
to repudiate the CRAN’s demands for a debate and to undermine the very grounds on
which such a debate might take place a priori.5 Indeed, the decontextualised emphasis
on ‘une note a` payer’ encloses reparations within a strictly financial framework, as
opposed to offering a more complex and open understanding of its terms.
Media Responses to Reparations
Likewise, the French press has tended to simplify the idea of reparations by boxing
them into a number of key misrepresentations and silencing strategies. There are some
rare exceptions, notably in Libe´ration, which provides more column space than any
other newspaper to the subject of slavery. But, broadly speaking, the media limits
reparations to three interconnecting tropes: the figure of the Afro-descendant with an
individual financial claim against the state; the figure of societal disharmony or
fracture; and the figure of anti-republicanism. To take each strategy in turn, there is an
automatic assumption that the term ‘re´parations’ signifies a financial transaction for
an individual, or group of individuals, as opposed to being understood as a process of
psychological, social, cultural and economic repair.6 Le Monde’s headline, for example,
ran: ‘Re´parations financie`res pour les descendants d’esclaves: le casse-teˆte des arbres
ge´ne´alogiques’ (emphasis added; Vincent 2013b). A ‘me´tis’ is interviewed to
demonstrate the absurdity of these genealogical and transgenerational claims: ‘J’aurais
bien du mal a` demander a` ma main droite de compenser ma main gauche . . . J’ai un
maıˆtre et un esclave en moi!’ (Vincent 2013b). This is a highly expedient way of
dismissing reparations which coincides with Hollande’s ‘note a` payer’, since
reparations are deemed too complex at a genealogical level. This is, of course, a
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perfectly valid argument, but its employment in media and political discourses stems
less from ethical considerations—for example, that the suffering of the enslaved
cannot, and should not, be quantified monetarily—than from a desire to jettison the
need for a debate over how to repair the past. Instead, the misplaced figure of the Afro-
descendent claimant is automatically produced and serves to mask a broader
translation of reparations that might assert their transformational potential.
Secondly, and in direct contradiction of its defined meaning as ‘corrective’ or
‘restorative’, reparations are represented as being inherently divisive and alienating. Le
Monde, having initially published the CRAN’s appeal, was especially keen to
demonstrate just how little support its action had in 2013. Whereas the 2012 appeal
had been endorsed by a number of high-profile public figures and academics, there
now appeared a widespread rejection of the debate. ‘La revendication du CRAN suscite
cependant peu d’enthousiasme de la plupart des spe´cialistes,’ stated Le Monde (Vincent
andWieder 2013). This split was echoed among the citizen-led associations such as the
Comite´ Marche 98 (CM98). Its president, Serge Romana, whose memory work had
been praised by Hollande in his 10 May 2013 speech, published a response to the
CRAN in Le Monde. In it, he denounced the fact that ‘certaines associations
conflictualisent la me´moire de l’esclavage en faisant miroiter l’obtention de re´parations
financie`res pour chaque descendant d’esclaves ou encore pour le paiement d’une dette
qui assurerait l’inde´pendance des Antilles. Des revendications qui s’appuient sur un
ressentiment anti-francais tenace’ (Romana 2013). A few days later, Le Monde
endorsed Romana’s comments in a report on the inauguration of a memorial to the
descendants of the enslaved in Seine-Saint-De´nis: ‘Pas d’esprit de revanche chez
Chantal Charles-Alfred [one of the attendees]. Comme tous ceux soutenus par le
CM98 pour inscrire le nom de leur aı¨eul sur un des monuments, elle n’a aucune envie
d’obtenir par ce biais des “re´parations financie`res”’ (Vincent 2013a). CM98 thus
exemplifies the ‘good’ republican association, whose work is focused on memory,
unlike the CRAN, whose actions are associated with social fracture and revenge.7
Thirdly, reparations are seen as inherently anti-republican and/or anti-French. This
has already been suggested by Romana’s comments which associate reparations with a
desire for independence.8 However, the sense that reparations are somehow inherently
‘anti-French’ can also be found resonating in more populist discourses, and for rather
different reasons. This is most clearly expressed in an article published in Le Figaro by
one of their regular contributors, Eric Zemmour, a far right-wing political journalist
whose views on immigration and outspoken racism have seen him prosecuted for
inciting racial hatred on more than one occasion, without losing his standing in the
public eye.
His response to the idea of reparations is typical of more populist misconceptions.
The headline, ‘La France paiera!’, embodies all the fears expressed by public figures,
such as Gallo and Bruckner, that France is under attack from an ethnic minority, in
this case a ‘black’ minority, that wants to undermine French republicanism and stoke
the flames of anti-white racism (Zemmour 2013). Zemmour’s criticism is directed
towards the recent publication of Tin’s essay Esclavage et Re´parations (2013), and
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gradually transforms Tin into (his vision of) France’s arch-enemy; a minority ‘ge´ne´ral
en chef de la guerre aux phobes’ whose sole aim is that ‘La norme majoritaire doit
mourir, pour que la marginalite´ devienne la norme’ (Zemmour 2013). Tin is the
archetype of Zemmour’s own phobia, ‘la dictature des minorite´s’; a phrase he borrows
from the sociologist Raymond Boudon (2010), who famously described political
correctness as ‘la tyrannie des minorite´s’. Under this new ‘dictatorship’, France risks
losing its attachment to traditional values which Zemmour (2013) lists as ‘nation,
famille, E´tat’ in a tripartite structure that is uncomfortably reminiscent of the pro-Nazi
Vichy Regime’s ‘Travail, Patrie, Famille’. Like Gallo, embedded in this rejection of
minority claims (reframed here as a form of tyranny) is a tacit desire for the simplicity
of a previous time where political correctness—listed as all the ‘phobes’, including
‘Lutte contre les homophobes, les xe´nophobes, les islamophobes’—did not interrupt
his barely disguised desire for a majority white Republic; in other words, for a period
when France was the true colonial ‘master’ and where the old colonial dream of
universal assimilation had been realised. Zemmour’s repulsion for the imagined threat
of a ‘minority’-led master nation is thus driven explicitly by his nostalgia for lost
national and colonial pride.
The result of these overlapping strategies is to hem reparations into a form of
identity politics that reawakens fears of republican fracture. If we place this limited
understanding within the context of the original appeal for a public discussion, we can
see just how far the media has misrecognised the terms of the debate. Indeed, this
process of misrepresentation is typical of the ways in which recognition struggles,
more broadly, are misinterpreted as identity politics. This results, as Fraser argues
(referring to recognition struggles more broadly), in the creation of reified group
identities that encourage ‘separatism and group enclaving’, while displacing the
struggle for the redistribution of resources, land and power (Fraser 2003, 22) that must
also be seen as part of the struggle for reparations. As Zemmour’s article clearly
demonstrates, ‘“minoritarian” claims’ are subsequently ‘rejected out of hand’, being
required instead to assimilate ‘to majority norms—in the name of secularism,
universalism, or republicanism’ (22). What is needed then is not to valorise group
identities, which might provoke fears of social fracturing, but rather to overcome
‘subordination’ by finding ways ‘to deinstitutionalize patterns of cultural value that
impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it’ (28;
emphasis in original). As this analysis shows, politics and media are a long way from
seeing reparations as part of this broader struggle for social and institutional change.
Instead, they are interpreted as a minority and identitarian attack on the Republic,
invoking nostalgia for the un-fractured past and/or for the old colonial dream of
universal assimilation, or rather, cultural dominance.
Renegotiating Recognition, Reparation and Reconciliation
The privileging of memory by media and political spokespersons—and note that
Hollande’s views are shared by his political rivals Jean-Francois Cope´ (UMP) (Raulin
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2013) and Marine Le Pen (Front National) (AFP 2013b)—sets up a dichotomy
whereby symbolic forms of reparation (such as memory and commemoration) are
placed in opposition to material forms of reparation (understood reductively as
financial payments to individual claimants). Memory emerges as the Republic’s
saviour in a direct reversal of the discourse of 2005–2006, where it was seen as the
Republic’s divisive enemy. As a public statement issued by the Ministe`re des Outre-
mers following Hollande’s speech commented: ‘La me´moire et la transmission de la
me´moire constituent la seule re´paration valable a` ce crime contre l’humanite´. Elle est
infiniment plus importante et unificatrice qu’une compensation financie`re, toujours
source de divisions’ (Ministe`re des Outre-mers 2013). Only this kind of reparation can
be deemed ‘republican’ since it resides in a symbolic realm that can be made to operate
in the name of national unity.
It is nostalgia that underpins this institutional striving for ‘une me´moire apaise´e’
(Ministe`re des Outre-mers 2013). Indeed, the overarching aim of the first government-
sponsored CPME (2004–2009) was to overcome social fracture and achieve
reconciliation precisely by creating both ‘une me´moire partage´e’ and ‘une histoire
commune’, or ‘ce que le philosophe Paul Ricœur a appele´ un “re´cit partage´?’ (CPME
2005, 13–14; see also Frith 2013b). This desire to achieve reconciliation by reaching for a
sharedmemory, and therefore for a shared sense of identity, appears to be threatened by
reparations because they are automatically linked to division—victims against
persecutors—and reified group identities that are viewed as inherently anti-republican.
If memory is the only possible course of action that the government can endorse, then it
must be asked whether the nostalgic performance of a shared national memory is
capable of affecting social change, notably with reference to racial discrimination and
socio-economic inequality in contemporary French society. A positive answer seems all
the less likely given that nostalgia underpins state-led acts of commemoration, which
have less to do with societal transformation and social justice than about performing
reconciliation in the name of national unity. Indeed, this performative aspect is inherent
in Chivallon’s pertinent observation that ‘la me´moire de l’esclavage vient au secours du
mode`le re´publicain par la de´monstration formidable qu’elle formule de la prise en
compte de la demande “communautaire”’ (2012, 54).
To date, the state’s responses have failed to engage with the inalienable fact that
crimes against humanity operate within an international juridical framework that is
rooted in the Nuremberg Trials. To follow Derrida (1999), although all crimes are
inherently irreparable in the sense that they are crimes committed against the
sacredness of humanity itself, juridical frameworks nonetheless reach out towards
some form of reparation and reconciliation by offering practical and ‘earthly’
(as opposed to sacred) responses to that which is impossible. Derrida sees this as an
important part of a broader ‘urgence universelle de la me´moire’ that desires
reconciliation with the crimes of the past, notably after Auschwitz. As such, ‘le concept
de “crime contre l’humanite´” reste a` l’horizon de toute la ge´opolitique du pardon’,
being a form of societal ‘forgiveness’ (or reconciliation) that can only enter human
institutions by attaching to it certain achievable conditions. This represents a different
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process of forgiveness to that which is divine and unconditional, meaning that, for
Derrida, a distinction needs to be made between a pure and unconditional pardon
on the one hand, and what might more accurately be termed a ‘processus de
re´conciliation’ on the other.
In borrowing from Ce´saire, Hollande (2013) rightly notes the impossibility of
repairing the crime of slavery. He therefore positions the crime beyond the realms of
reparative justice (which requires that the punishment fit the crime), suggesting that it
demands an act of forgiveness so all-embracing that it can only be divine. However, his
instrumentalisation of the phrase ‘re´paration impossible’ also works to gloss over the
important fact that his speech is framed by a juridical (not a religious) framework—
the Taubira law—which is implicitly linked to human rights justice and reparations,
even if its goal is primarily memorial. Despite their seeming impossibility, reparations,
in more than just a symbolic form, ought to be at least considered since they offer the
only possible course of action that contains end goals that are social, political, moral
and psychological, rather than spiritual. Without this practical approach, the French
government is only dealing with the abstract symbolism of recognition couched in a
quasi-religious language that attests to a crime for which there is no earthly institution
capable of providing Derrida’s unfettered pardon for the crimes of the past.
We might see the Taubira law as offering one such a human and political response to
demands to recognise the history of slavery and the slave trade, but it does not provide
a practical way to move beyond that legal recognition by addressing the nefarious
effects of slave history on contemporary society. Such an approach would challenge the
‘everyday institutionalized patterns and practices that deny social groups participatory
citizenship’ in order to ‘constitute different varieties of collective “we” than the norms
that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when these polities were
formed’ (Hobson 2003, 3). If the CRAN, and notably its leader Louis-George Tin, have
emerged in recent years as an outspoken and controversial activist group, this is not
simply because of its emphasis on ‘black’ identity (which is anathema to republican
models of neutrality), but also because it calls for the state to move beyond memory
and towards these kinds of reparative actions.
As this article has shown, the strategies used to delegitimise reparations operate by
legitimising memory as the moral and republican response to the crimes of the past,
one that has the additional advantage of feeding into mythologies of nation building.
In this way, the ‘abortive ritual’ (Trouillot 2000) of commemoration becomes less
about recognition than about nostalgia, creating what Boym terms ‘a comforting
collective script for individual longing’ that aims to establish ‘social cohesion, a sense
of security and an obedient relationship to authority’ (2001, 42). At the same time,
the transformation of a recognition struggle into identity politics not only evokes
nostalgia for a less complicated and more unified past, but should also be seen as a
political strategy for non-action at an institutional level; that is, for action that
remains symbolic and memorial, as opposed to practical and transformational.
Reparations then should be seen as the very opposite of inaction since they pull us
away from a top-down politics of symbolism and towards a bottom-up politics of
16 N. Frith
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 04
:42
 20
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
action. This is not to dismiss the importance of acts of recognition, but rather to
state that memory must be accompanied by real policies to confront racial
discrimination and socio-economic inequality, or risk being consumed by the
nostalgia of republican nationalism.
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Notes
[1] Counter-memory here refers to a memory that works against official versions of history
(Chivallon 2012, 115).
[2] Full details can be found on the website of Nora’s association, Liberte´ pour l’Histoire: http://
www.lph-asso.fr/.
[3] The original Comite´ pour la Me´moire de l’Esclavage (2004–2009) under Maryse Conde´ was
renamed Comite´ pour la Me´moire et l’Histoire de l’Esclavage (2009–2012) under Francoise
Verge`s, and has just been renamed Comite´ National pour la Me´moire et l’Histoire de l’Esclavage
(CNMHE) under Myriam Cottias to clearly distinguish its work from that of an association
(CMPHE 2013, 56).
[4] See the CRAN’s website for a list of similar acts designed to bring the French state to account:
http://www.le-cran.fr/index.html.
[5] For an analysis of Sarkozy’s appropriation of Ce´saire, see Frith (2013a).
[6] Both the appeal of 12 October 2012 and Caricom’s 10-point plan are examples of a far more
open understanding of reparations.
[7] Romana was a member of the first CPME (2004–2009), but left in protest against the Comite´’s
selection of 10 May in honour of the Taubira law and not, as he wished, the march of 23 May
1998, which was instrumental in mobilising political support for the Taubira law (see http://
www.cm98.fr/index.php?option¼com_content&view¼article&id¼48&Itemid¼57). On 2 May
2008, Romana succeeded in gaining official recognition for 23 May, with a public decree setting
this date aside for the descendants of the enslaved to mourn their ancestors. Romana is once
again part of the new CNMHE.
[8] Romana is likely referring to MIR, run by the politician Garcin Malsa, one of the founding
members of a political independence movement ‘La Parole du Peuple’ (now the Mouvement
Inde´pendentiste Martiniquais).
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